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Petitioner petitions for rehearing in the above cases and as
cause for same alleges:
This court did not render a decision on appellants' points
on appeal.

Instead, the court humorously quips a decision on just

one item of appellants' contentions. Humorous, of course, to the
author of the opinion and the justices who concurred in it. But
not to appellants. These law suits were very serious to appellants
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Andersons particularly, encompassing as they do most serious
economic transaction of their lives.

Appellants submit that the

court and each justice comprising the court have an obligation to
render a decision by the court on each point presented on appeal.
Following we submit is where the court failed in this obligation.

NORLING v. ANDERSON ET AL, CASE NO. 13769
1.

THE APPELLANTS1 CONTENTION THAT TITLE PASSED ON AUGUST 2, 1973
(Brief 18-22)
Appellants contended that the deed to the real property involved

was delivered by Norling to the Andersons on August 2, 1973 and on
that day (August 2,
to the Andersons.
(a)

1973) title to the property passed from Norling
This contention was based on the following items:

Finding

In Finding 2,

the lower court found that:

. . . after execution of the deed, the deed was
delivered to defendant June J. Anderson who initialed
the deed to indicate delivery of the same, the
attorney stating that a deed must be delivered in order
to be valid. (Brief 8)
(b)

Uncontradicted Evidence

The uncontradicted evidence of attorney Merrill K. Davis
was that the deed was prepared by him at the request of Norling,
that Norling told Davis that she wanted the property to go to the
Andersons since they had been staying with her and taking care of
her; that he explained to her the difference between a will and a
deed; that with a deed there was no need of a will and the property
would not have to be probated. (Brief 7-10)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The uncontradicted evidence and the testimony of Mrs.
Norling was that at the time she executed the deed and delivered
it to June Anderson she intended the Andersons to have the property,
that she was not mad at the Andersons at that time, and that it
was not until after the execution of said deed and after she went
to live with other brothers and sisters that she changed her mind.
(Brief 14-16)
Not a single word of testimony or evidence is mentioned in
respondent's brief or in the court's decision contradicting the
testimony of Mr. Davis and Mrs. Norling,

One would surmise from

reading the court's decision that there was no such testimony.
(c) Appellant's Authorities
Besides Jordan v. Jordan, 21 U 2d 348, 445 P 2d 765 (1968),
appellants cited and relied on the following authorities which
specifically hold that when a grantor executes and delivers a deed
with the intention that the grantee have the property, a subsequent
change of mind cannot upset the conveyance:

Simmons v. Murphy (Ark)

360 SW 2d 765 (1962), citing 26 C.J.S. Deeds, Sec. 41; Wilcox v.
Hardisty (Cal App.) 212 P 633; Lossee v. Jones, 120 U 325, 235 P 2d
132 (1951).
This is Horn Book law.
THE COURT'S DECISION ON APPELLANTS CONTENTION
The courtfs decision deals only with item (a) Finding, namely,
the physical delivery by Mrs. Norling on August 2, 1973 with the
instructions of the attorney, that June Anderson initial the deed
to show delivery, and the return of the deed to possession of Norling.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Merrill Davis1 directions that June Anderson initial the
deed to show delivery was lawyer-like and most responsible
inasmuch as Mrs. Norling was to take custody of it.
Neither respondent nor the court cite a single authority
contrary to the above authorities that when a grantor physically
delivers a deed to the grantee with the intention that the grantee
have the property, an unrevealed mental reservation or a subsequent
change of mind does not affect the passing of title of the deed
upon delivery.
In lieu of authority to support its decision, the court
searches out factual distinctions in the Utah cases cited.

Some

factual distinctions always exist between cases. The court's
factual distinctions do not bear on the law stated in the decisions.
In distinguishing Jordan (cited above), the court states
that in that case the grantor's lips were sealed by death, wheras
the grantor in the instant case was alive and testified.

But the

court does not point out what Mrs. Norling, the grantor, testified.
Which was that at the time of the delivery of the deed, August 2,
1973, she wanted the Andersons to have the property, that she was
not mad at them at that time, and that she thereafter changed her
mind.

Not a single word of testimony, by Mrs. Norling or otherwise,

is in the record contradicting this testimony.

Nor does the court

point out Mr. Davis1 testimony that Mrs. Norling told him she wanted
the Andersons to have the property since they had been staying with
her and caring for her. Not a single word of contrary evidence or
testimony is referred to in respondent's brief or in the court's
decision.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In distinguishing Lossee the court said it is "inappropros
here since it has to do with a delivery to a trustee who was
interdicted to deliver a deed to the grantees after the death.
But what has that to do with the principle of law in Lossee that
appellants rely upon, namely, that a grantor cannot change his
mind.
The court follows the footsteps of the lower court and
appears to rule that as the deed of August 2, 1973 was executed
concurrently with the codicil of Norling's will (same date) and
the fact that there were prior deeds and wills of Mrs. Norling,
that Norling intended the document to be a will rather than a
deed—the court referred to the deed as "in the nature of an
instrument ambulatoria voluntis".
What relevance have past deeds and wills to the execution
of the deed of August 2, 1973 when we have a competent grantor
whose lips were not sealed by death and who told the attorney her
intention was to deed her property to the Andersons and so testified.
(The prior deeds were torn up and destroyed and renounced by the
grantees by reason of the changes in the financial situations of
the children). (Brief 2 0)
It is common practice for attorneys to draft wills concurrent
with deeds disposing of the same property.

And where, as here, the

attorney fully explains to the grantor that the deed would obviate
probate, what relevance can past transactions have to do with the
question of delivery on August 2, 1973?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The term ambulatori voluntis appears to define the nature
of a document and particularly refers to a "changeable will" rather
than a principle of law. Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Ed;
Bouviers Law Dictionary (Rawles Edition).

See also Monninger v.

Koob, 405 111. 417, 91 NE 2d 411, 414 (1950).
However appellants do find the case of Fonda v. Miller, 411
111. 74. 103 NE 2d 98 (1952)

ruling on the question of whether a deed

should be considered a will where the grantor retained possession
of the deed and it was never in fact delivered to the grantee but
retained in the possession of the grantor's attorney (where grantor
had retained a life estate).
also changed his mind.

In Fonda the grantor after execution

And in his will he repudiated the delivery

reciting that it had not been his intention that it convey title.
(In norling's Codicil she recited that she had conveyed title to
the property involved.)

In Fonda the lower court found that the

delivery
. . .was intended to operate as a testimentary
disposition of said real estate, and that said deed
was never delivered to the grantees named thereon,
(same situation as in instant case)
The appellate court in Fonda reversed this decision, holding that
The deed in the present case was executed with
all the formalities required by law and made under
the advice of an attorney who was fully aware of
the requisites and differences between a deed and
a will.
. . .

Courts do not attach as much importance to the manual
possession of the deed as they do to the intent of
the grantor as gathered from the evidence in regard
to the vesting of title.
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The execution of the deed with the formality
required by law, the consultation with an attorney
at the time of making it, and the subsequent acts
of the grantor recognizing the title of the grantees
until he became displeased with Mrs. Miller's refusal
to execute a deed at his request, all indicate beyond
any doubt that he intended the deed to take effect
immediately upon its execution and recording.
.

. •

The law does not make the grantor's retention of a
deed duly executed proof of non-delivery, especially
where he still retains the right of enjoyment.
The conclusions of the court that the deed of August 2, 1973
was an "instrument arnbulatoria voluntis" was basically conceived
by the court. A party has no opportunity to respond when the court
enters the arena.

In the original verified complaint, plaintiff

alleged that the deed was conditionally delivered not to be recorded
until plaintiff died.

In the unverified amended complaint plaintiff

alleged that after signature, the deed was deposited in the safety
deposit box to remain until after the plaintiff's death.
The "bit of Houdini routine" was not in Mr. Davis1 handling
of the execution of the deed and having June Anderson acknowledge
acceptance of delivery before giving back possession to Mrs. Norling,
but in the court's transposing a deed into a will (absent legal
precedent).
2.

APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT EVEN IF THE DEED WAS DELIVERED BY
MRS. NORLING ON CONDITION THAT IT NOT BE RECORDED UNTIL AFTER
HER DEATH, THAT COULD NOT AFFECT THE PASSING OF TITLE ON AUGUST
2, 1973. (Brief 22)
This contention should be answered if the court adheres to

its decision that there was no intent to deliver on August 2, 1973
and that such delivery represented no authority to June to record
the deed on January 11, 1974. From respondent's complaint and
amended complaint, the theory of respondent and the court appears
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that the deed was delivered on condition that it not be recorded
until Norling's death.
In support of appellants1 contentions that a condition against
recording could not prevent title passing, appellants cite Takacs
v. Takacs, 317 Mich 72, 26 NW 2d (1947), citing 26 C.J.S. Deeds,
Sec. 48, pp. 251-52, 28 Am Jur 2d Escrow, Sec. 12, holding that such
an attempted delivery vests title in the grantee regardless of such
condition.
Neither respondents nor the court cite contrary authority.
THE COURT'S DECISION ON APPELLANT'S CONTENTION
The court states not a single word on this contention.

NORLING GUARDIANSHIP, CASE NO.

13764

This case involves whether Mrs. Norling, by reason of old
age, weakness of mind, was able unassisted to properly manage and
take care of her property and would be likely to be deceived or
imposed upon by artful or designing persons (Utah Code 75-13-20).
3.

APPELLANT CONTENDED THAT THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MENTAL EXAMINATION UNDER
RULE 35 (SPECIFICALLY PROVIDING FOR MENTAL EXAMINATIONS) UNDER
THE UNCONTRADICTED SHOWING THAT SUCH EXAMINATION WOULD DETERMINE
NORLING1 S MENTAL CAPACITY TO CARE FOR HER PROPERTY OR HER
LIKELIHOOD TO BE IMPOSED UPON BY ARTFUL AND DESIGNING PERSONS.
(Brief 11)
Even after the court had denied the motion, and trial was had

without the benefit of such examination, it again refused to order
examination despite Dr. Verne Peterson's testimony that it "would
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be rather a pleasant hour" as opposed to a trial setting.
Respondent does not respond to this contention except to state
the notice of hearing was one day defective. No continuance was
asked and this motion, as all other motions, were heard at the
earliest possible date to comply with the request of respondent's
attorney.
THE COURT'S DECISION
The court does not rule on this contention, not a word.

4.

APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
APPOINTING A GUARDIAN OF NORLING'S ESTATE ON THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THAT SHE HAD SUFFERED BRAIN DAMAGE, WAS
INCOMPETENT TO PROPERLY MANAGE HER PROPERTY AND WAS LIKELY
TO BE IMPOSED UPON BY ARTFUL AND DESIGNING PERSONS (Brief 10-11)
Relevant to this point, the court will notice that the lower

court did not weigh the evidence and elect to make findings as it
could have done under Rule 41 (b). See Petty v. Cindy Manufacturing Corp., 17 U 2d 32, 404 P 2d 30 (1965); Lawrence v. Bamberger Ry
Co., 3 U 2d 247, 282 P 2d 335 (1952).
Mrs. Norling competent.

The lower court did not find

It granted a non-suit, ruling that "there

was not sufficient evidence presented by the petitioner in support
of her petition to show the need for an appointment of a guardian
in the Estate of Jenny Johanson Norling."

Thus the duty of this

court was to determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence
to show Mrs. Norling1s incompetency under Utah Code 75-13-20.
Mrs. Norling1s situation appears to fall precisely within
Utah Code 75-13-20.

In her deposition of April 22, 1974 (p. 67)

she testified:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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. . .after I got that pneumonia, I've never been
so sick in my life. . . . That sickness took an
awful lot out of me.

I always have had to take care of myself. .
But now I'm too old.

And the testimony of Dr. Verne Peterson, eminently qualified,
that Mrs. Norling had suffered brain damage and was incompetent to
properly manage her property and was likely to be imposed upon by
artful and designing persons, stands uncontradicted.
THE COURT'S DECISION
The court does not rule on this contention.

Not a word.

The court's decision in these cases is a grave miscarriage
of justice.
It is respectfully submitted that petition for rehearing should
be granted.
Date:

June Jj

1975.

r
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7ILLIAM fl. HENDE
Attorney for Appellants.
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